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Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the 
Behavioral Economics of Divorce 
Bargaining 
Introduction 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryant 
Deborah Small tt 
Family law has become increasingly dependent on private 
contracts to determine the allocation of entitlements before, 
during, and after marriage. Ideally, prenuptial contracts, divorce 
settlements, and child custody agreements each require the 
parties involved to negotiate effectively in order to maximize the 
joint welfare of the spouses, ex-spouses, and children. Evidence 
suggests, however, that this contractarian ideal is not borne out by 
the current reality in which women are at a financial disadvantage 
to their male counterparts after divorce. Women, with or without 
children, experience an average decline in standard of living of 
about one-third upon divorce.' Men experience a slight increase in 
standard of living because their family size decreases while they 
maintain their personal income. 2 
Both legal scholars and economists have posited a link 
t. J.D., M.A. Psychology. Doctoral Candidate in Psychology, University of 
Pennsylvania. 3720 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Email address: 
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tt. Assistant Professor of Marketing, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. 700 Jon M. Huntsman Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Email 
address: deborahs@wharton.upenn.edu. 
1. Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences 
of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (finding "an average change in econ@mic 
status of [minus] 33 percent" for women post-divorce); see also Richard V. 
Burkhauser et al., Economics of Divorce, 28 DEMOGRAPHY 353 (1991) (finding 
"pretax and transfer living standards fell for the median woman by 37%" following 
divorce or separation). 
2. See Richard R. Peterson, A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of 
Divorce, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 528, 532 (1996) (finding that women experience a 27% 
decline in standard of living, and men experience a 10% increase); see also Matthew 
D. Bramlett & William D. Mosher, First Marriage Dissolution, Divorce, and 
Remarriage: United States, in ADVANCE DATA at 2 (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, 
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, No. 323, 2001) ("The economic 
consequences of divorce can be severe for women. For men, the retention of 
income combined with decreased family size may actually result in an increase in 
his new household's income per capita."). 
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between negative outcomes for women and the current system of 
divorce bargaining.' Legal scholars have couched this in terms of 
women's preference for cooperation4 or an "ethic of care."5 Thus, 
even if private ordering is theoretically desirable, questions 
remain. Are private negotiations an effective means to attain a 
mutually beneficial contract? What background legal rules might 
support such a regime? Why do women fare worse in these private 
negotiations? This Article reviews empirical evidence suggesting 
that men and women bargain differently. We hope to shed light on 
the implications of current trends in family law that have 
transpired in the wake of the changing status of women in 
American society. 
In keeping with current social-psychological research and 
theory, we conceptualize gender as a cultural or situational 
variable, rather than sex per se, which is a biological 
categorization. 6 This approach examines the psychological 
variables (i.e., low entitlement, low power, relational construal) 
that underlie gender differences in bargaining. With this Article, 
we hope to contribute to a broader conversation about the role of 
gender research in legal theory without invoking simplistic 
stereotypes about men and women. We consider both motivational 
and cognitive factors that affect men's and women's bargaining 
behavior, asking not only how gender affects behavior, but also 
when and in what conditions gender effects are likely to emerge. 
3. See Penelope Eileen Bryan, "Collaborative Divorce':· Meaningful Reform or 
Another Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1001, 1002 (1999) (arguing that 
divorce bargaining under conditions of power disparities, gender bias, and 
indeterminate laws yields negative outcomes for women); see also Lenore J. 
Weitzman, Gender Differences in Custody Bargaining in the United States, in 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 395, 404 
(Lenore Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds., 1992) (arguing that bargaining over 
custody agreements yields negative results for women after divorce). 
4. See Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 
VA. L. REV. 421, 423-33 (1992) (arguing that women are disadvantaged at divorce 
because they have a greater "taste for cooperation" than men); see also Trina Grillo, 
The Mediation Alternative: Progress Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1603-
04 (1991) (arguing that women's propensity for cooperation makes them vulnerable 
in a divorce mediation). 
5. Grillo, supra note 4, at 1601; see also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly.· 
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 488 (1992) 
(noting that a wife's care orientation can interfere with her ability to negotiate 
effectively with her husband); Nancy Ilman Meyers, Power (lm)Balance and the 
Failure of Impartiality in Attorney-Mediated Divorce, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 853, 880 
(1996) (arguing that mediation has the potential to "enhance the threat that 
women's care orientation already poses for them in financial negotiations"). 
6. See, e.g., Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Constraints & Triggers: Situational 
Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 951, 963 
(2005) (finding that the effects of gender "are situationally bound"). 
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Men and women may differ in the kinds of goals and the levels of 
engagement that they bring to a negotiation, as well as their 
beliefs and mental models of the negotiating situation. 
Empirical research on gender and negotiation offers insight 
into the differences between men and women at the bargaining 
table and the situa tiona! variables that exacerbate or eliminate 
the differences. The relationship between gender and bargaining 
is complicated. For instance, many studies show that women 
perform poorly in negotiating tasks when gender is made salient, 
i.e., when women are made more conscious of gender before the 
task.' In contrast, women actually outperform men when gender 
is salient and when the stereotype that women are not good 
negotiators has been explicitly invoked. 8 Thus, the same 
stereotype (women are not good at negotiating) elicits different 
behavior depending on how it is invoked. Given the heterogeneity 
of gender effects, we expect that gender effects in divorce 
bargaining could vary importantly as a result of the legal context. 
Following a brief review of legal scholarship on economics, 
psychology, and family law (Part I), we consider three trends in 
modern family law (Parts II, III, and IV), and discuss research on 
the psychology of gender and negotiation that relate to each trend. 
While there are a number of different potential bargaining 
situations, we focus here on divorce settlement agreements, 
though it is clear that many of the issues raised in that context 
would apply to prenuptial agreements or custody arrangements. 
The first trend we review is the increasing preference for private, 
face-to-face negotiations rather than judge-made settlements. We 
review literature suggesting that women and men may bring 
different goals to the bargaining table, which may produce 
different behavior and outcomes for men and women in these 
negotiations. The second trend is that modern family laws are 
often quite vague, using standards like "equitable distribution"9 
and "best interest of the child." 10 Since gender differences are 
typically larger when situations are ambiguous, indetermip.ate 
7. See Laura J. Kray et al., Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation 
and Reactance in Negotiations, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 942, 946 (2001) 
(offering empirical results to support the theory of stereotype threat by 
demonstrating that implicitly making a negotiation task "with gender-linked 
expectations ... diagnostic of ability" negatively affected the performance of women 
in that negotiation). 
8. See, e.g., id. at 955 (showing that women performed better when the 
stereotype was explicitly activated while men's performance suffered). 
9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 61.075 (West 2002). 
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 30-3-150 (1996). 
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legal standards may provide a context where gender is most likely 
to matter. Finally, we discuss the trend toward complete financial 
separation at the time of divorce, which decreases the possibility of 
alimony. 11 Research indicates that women are more comfortable 
asking for things than negotiating for things.12 Alimony involves 
transfers from one party to another, whereas a financial 
settlement involves a division of resources between two parties; 
the former seems like more of an ask situation and the latter more 
of a negotiate situation. 
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein have recently suggested 
that the utility of behavioral law and economics is that 
psychological research can both highlight instances of limited 
rationality and suggest frames or approaches to help reduce 
reasoning errors. 13 In the final Part, we make some preliminary 
suggestions for new directions in legal scholarship and empirical 
research. 
I. Legal Scholarship on Economics, Psychology, & Family 
Law 
The law and economics movement has changed the way that 
legal scholars think about family law.14 Drawing on the work of 
University of Chicago economist Gary Becker, legal theorists have 
conceptualized the decision to marry as essentially a consumer 
decision, one that involves a comparison of the costs and benefits 
of marriage versus single life. IS Similarly, divorce is also a kind of 
good, chosen if it offers an increase in welfare. 16 Once marriage is 
couched in the language of the market, it is easier to see the 
appeal of contract-based family law, offering individuals the 
chance to optimize their personal and joint welfare by designing 
exactly the kind of relationship that they find most beneficia].17 
11. Many states refer to alimony as "spousal maintenance." See, e.g., MINN. 
STAT.§ 518.552 (2003). 
12. See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T AsK 3 (2003). 
13. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL 
STUD. !99, 200 (2005). 
14. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. 
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 517, 517-29 (2001) (summarizing legal scholarly 
thinking on economics and divorce). 
15. See Richard A. Posner, Gary Becker's Contributions to Law and Economics, 
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 211, 213 (1993) (summarizing Becker's argument for the 
application of economic principles to marriage and divorce law). 
16. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision-Making About Marriage and 
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 44-45 (1990). 
17. See Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size Fits All to 
Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV.1479, 152()-26 (2001). 
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This is, of course, a fairly controversial shift. IS Traditionally, 
marriage and divorce were regarded as moral commitments, and 
breach of the marriage contract, most notably adultery, was 
i!legaJ.l9 The law and economics approach to marriage takes 
individual liberty and the maximization of welfare as its 
normative basis rather than religious or moral dictates about 
marriage as a lifetime commitment. 2o 
This Article mainly considers a less controversial application 
of economic theory to family law because we are interested in 
contracts allocating property after divorce. Most state divorce 
laws rely to some extent on a conceptualization of the marriage 
agreement as a personal contract; 21 laws governing separation of 
property at divorce no longer specify financial penalties for the at-
fault party,'' and spousal support is on the decline. 23 Tradition 
may view with skepticism a system that conceives of marriage and 
divorce as goods, but a divorce settlement is in fact about assets, 
18. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and Law: No Fault Divorce 
and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 555~81 (1994) (discussing the 
negative costs of removing morality from the marriage/divorce discourse). 
19. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 
84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1295--96 ("The understanding that adultery, physical and 
mental cruelty, and desertion are unacceptable spousal behavior was captured 
under traditional law in fault grounds for divorce which gave a right to terminate 
the marriage to the 'innocent and injured' spouse."). Twenty-three states still have 
laws against adultery. See ALA. CODE§ 13A.13·2 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13-1408 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.01 (West 
2007); GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-6-19 (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 18-6601 (2004); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-7 (West 2002); !CAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (2006); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 14 (LexisNexis 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.30 (West 
2004); MINN. STAT.§ 609.36 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2003); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 255.17 (McKinney 2000); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-09 (1997); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 872 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-15-60 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 
(2004); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (LexisNexis 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.16 
(West 2005). 
20. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Marriage: The Long-Term Contract, in LA-w; AND 
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 10, 12 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert 
Rowthorn eds., 2002) ("Marriage, despite being the culmination of romantic love, 
can be fruitfully analyzed employing the tools of rational choice."). 
21. See, e.g., Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998) 
(''Marriage ... is a civil contract."). 
22. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT§ 307, 9A U.L.A 288-89 (1998) (providing 
that property division should be determined "without regard to marital 
misconduct"). 
23. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New 
York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 
697-724 (1991) (citing statistics showing that alimony awards are less frequent, for 
less money, and less often permanent since the adoption of New York's equitable 
distribution law). 
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earning capacity, and other things easily understood as part of an 
economic transaction. We do not make any fundamental challenge 
to the notion of economic efficiency in divorce bargaining as an 
appropriate normative goal. Rather, our intention in this Article 
is to address human behavior in divorce negotiations. Specifically, 
we review the empirical literature on negotiation, with an eye 
toward how differences in bargaining behavior between men and 
women might systematically affect the success of private divorce 
agreements given the dominant principles of modern family law. 
There are strong efficiency arguments supporting the modern 
divdrce regime. For example, the parties may be in a much better 
position than the judge to determine how best to divide their 
property to maximize the total utility of the distribution. Though 
a couple's two cars may be of equal value, the husband may prefer 
one and the wife the other; individual or idiosyncratic preferences 
are best determined by the parties rather than by an assessment 
of market value, which is used by judges. It is important to note 
that there is considerable counterevidence to suggest that divorce 
negotiations are not particularly efficient. 24 In fact, it has been 
the role of behavioral economics to document many of the common 
heuristics and biases that impede efficient negotiating, including 
self-serving biases, 2·5 the fixed-pie bias,26 and the endowment 
effect. 27 
When talking about divorce bargaining in this Article, 
though, we are always referring to a gendered negotiation in the 
sense that a divorcing couple has historically been comprised of 
one woman and one man. 28 Given this fact, it is important to also 
24. See Peterson, supra note 2, at 534 (showing a 27% decline in women's 
standard of living after negotiated divorce settlements). 
25. See Linda Thompson & George Lowenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of 
Fairness and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 0RG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 176 (1992) (describing experiments in which subjects' assessments 
of fairness are consistently in line with their own self-interest). 
26. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, Heuristics in Negotiation: 
Limitations to Effective Dispute Resolution, in NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS 51, 
62-63 (Max H. Bazerman & Roy J. Lewicki eds., 1983) (reviewing evidence that 
negotiating parties overlook opportunities for joint gain, instead focusing on a 
"fixed pie of resources" where one side's gain is the other's loss). 
27. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 211, 211 (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000) (showing empirical evidence that entitlements affect parties' 
valuation of a good). 
28. This has begun to change as same·sex marriages and civil unions grow 
more popular. The Massachusetts divorce statute applies to the dissolution of 
same·sex marriages. See Salucco v. Alldredge, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 498, No. 
02E0087GC1, 2004 WL 864459, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2004) ("Opposite· 
sex couples who marry are afforded the opportunity to extinguish their legal 
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consider psychological variables associated with gender. 
II. Law: Private Bargaining, Not Judge-Made Settlement 
Modern divorce law favors private negotiations to determine 
the allocation of assets after divorce.29 Couples can, for example, 
draft a contract individually, as a couple, or with their lawyers. 30 
Couples who are unable to reach an agreement with their lawyers 
alone may be ordered by the court to go through mediation before 
the judge will hear the case. 31 
The next Section considers four areas of psychological 
research showing systematic gender differences in bargaining 
behavior that are likely to be manifest in such private settlements: 
communal goals, impression management, stereotype threat, and 
power dynamics. 
A. Communal Goals 
In bargaining research, two general kinds of goals have been 
identified: "task-specific goals" and "interaction goals."32 Task-
specific goals are normally tangible goals that negotiators set for 
themselves, including getting a good deal, obtaining the desired 
goods, and perhaps minimizing transaction costs. 33 Interaction 
goals reflect the interpersonal dimension of negotiations. 34 
Considerable research suggests that women, more than men, place 
a great weight on interpersonal goals in negotiation relative to 
task-specific goals, and that women are more attuned to the 
relational component of a negotiation. 35 They are more likely than 
relationship through the mechanism of divorce. Reasoning follows there from that 
same-sex couples who enter into legal relationships should also be allowed to 
dissolve their legal relationships."). In states that recognize civil unions, 
dissolution proceedings for same-sex civil unions may be very similar to divorce. 
See William C. Duncan, Survey of Interstate Recognition of Quasi-Marital Statuses, 
3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 617, 622-23 (noting that a Massachusetts court decision 
treated a Vermont civil union dissolution substantially the same as marital 
dissolution). 
29. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
30. See id. at 952-56 (discussing private ordering in divorce). 
31. Jessica Pearson, Family Mediation, in NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT· 
CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH 51, 55 (Susan Keilitz ed., 1994). 
32. Laura Kray & Linda Babcock, Gender in Negotiations: A Motivated Social 
Cognitive Analysis, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 203, 205----09 (Leigh L. 
Thompson ed., 2006). 
33. !d. 
34. !d. 
35. Deborah M. Kolb & Gloria C. Coolidge, Her Place at the Table: A 
Consideration of Gender Issues in Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND 
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men to report concern for an opponent's feelings, and they are 
motivated to maintain a good relationship during negotiations, 36 
This stems from the general finding that women are more 
communally-oriented than men37 and that their self-concept is 
more dependent on their relationships with others, 38 which may in 
turn make them focus more on interpersonal goals and less on 
task -specific goals. 
It is possible that this general gendered pattern is less 
applicable to the divorce context because motives to maintain a 
good relationship or to attend positively to the opponent's feelings 
maY be less evident, even for women, when a relationship is being 
terminated. 39 Conversely, there are reasons to suspect that 
gender differences will persist in this context. In many cases the 
relationship is not completely terminated; the divorce may be 
amicable or the couple may have children for whom it is important 
to remain on good terms. 40 
It may appear foolish for women to have these goals at the 
expense of maximizing their financial welfare, but relat~onal goals 
make good sense if both parties have them because cooperation 
typically increases joint gain. 41 The situation is much like the 
famous prisoners' dilemma in which two interrogated players must 
choose independently whether to cooperate by agreeing to say 
nothing or defect by betraying the other. 42 If they both cooperate, 
PRACTICE 261, 264 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991). 
36. Wesley C. King, Jr. & Thomas D. Hinson, The Influence of Sex and Equity 
Sensitivity on Relationship Preferences, Assessment of Opponent, and Outcomes in a 
Negotiation Experiment, 20 J. MGMT. 605, 611 (1994). 
37. See Susan E. Cross & Laura Madson, Models of the Self" Sel{-Construals 
and Gender, 122 PSYCHOL. BULL. 5, 5 (1997). 
38. See, e.g., Serge Guimond et al., Social Comparison, Self-Stereotyping, and 
Gender Differences in Self-Construals, 90 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 221, 
221 (2006) (finding that "women define themselves higher in relational 
interdependence than men"). 
39. See Anne·Marie Am bert, Relationships Between Ex-Spouses: Individual and 
Dyadic Perspectives, 5 J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 327, 343 (1988) (describing 
an experiment in which divorced men and women expressed no interest in 
relationship repair). 
40. See Elizabeth E. Graham, Turning Points and Commitment in Post-Divorce 
Relationships, 64 CoMM. MONOGRAPHS 350, 361 (1997). For an example of what 
might happen if a divorced couple does not act amicably, see Colin Camerer & 
Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 209, 212 (1995), which describes "ultimatum game" experiments in which 
subjects reject a monetary award in order to deprive an unfair player from a 
reward. 
41. See JAMES N. WEBB, GAM:E THEORY: DECISIONS, INTERACTIONS AND 
REVOLUTION 62-63 (2007) (describing the optimal solution of the prisoners' 
dilemma). 
42. !d. 
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they each receive a short prison sentence. 4' If they both defect, 
they each receive a medium prison sentence. 44 If, however, one 
cooperates and the other defects, the cooperatcr receives a very 
long sentence and the defector gets off scot-free. 45 Divorce 
settlements similarly benefit from cooperation. In the "divorcee's 
dilemma," if one party acts selfishly and the other cooperates, then 
the cooperator fares worse than if that person had also acted 
selfishly. 46 Hypothetically, if a woman cooperates (i.e., tries to 
maintain a positive relationship at the expense of maximizing 
financial gains) and a man defects (i.e., tries exclusively tc 
maximize financial gains), then the woman ends up poorer for it. 
B. Impression Management 
A somewhat different type of interpersonal goal is impression 
management. Impression management is the straightforward 
concept that people's behavior is affected by how they want others 
to perceive them.47 In general, people want others to judge them 
favorably, 48 meaning that behavior is affected by others' 
expectations. Since different expectations exist for men's and 
women's behavior, 49 such expectations may contribute to divergent 
behaviors. Women are typically expected to play nice and to not 
be aggressive, 50 whereas expectations for men are quite the 
opposite."' Studies show, for example, that women's competitive 
behavior differs as a function of who is watching; women behave 
less competitively when they are in public than when they are in 
privateJi2 Furthermore, women's personal entitlement or self~ 
evaluation is also greater in private than in public. In one study, 
43. Id. at 62. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See, e.g., Andrew DuBrin, Sex Differences in the Use and Effectiveness of 
Tactics of Impression Management, 74 PSYCHOL. REP. 531 (1994) (discussing 
different impression-management strategies and comparing men's and women's 
uses and perceptions of these strategies). 
48. See, e.g., id. at 532 (describing the different impression-management 
strategies used to create favorable impressions in others). 
49. See, e.g., Laurie Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The 
Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 629 (1998) (describing the different ways men and 
women have been socialized to act). 
50. See, e.g., id. at 630 (explaining that women are expected to be more 
"community oriented''). 
51. See, e.g., id. at 629 (explaining that men are expected to be more aggressive 
in order to compete for economic resources and attention from women). 
52. E.g., id. at 630. 
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experimenters offered participants a fixed amount of money and 
told them to work on a task until they believed they had earned 
the money.'3 Women worked longer on the task when they 
believed that they were being monitored than when they were 
being unmonitored. 54 Men, on the other hand, worked the same 
amount in each condition. 55 
As mentioned in the previous Section, women care more 
about other goals beyond maximizing their share of assets. 
Relational goals can be functional for both parties in negotiation, 56 
but there are strategic reasons why women in particular should 
bargain in a more cooperative manner given the social 
environment they inhabit. Research indicates that women who 
negotiate aggressively or behave in a self-interested manner suffer 
adverse consequences. 57 Discrimination plays an important role 
in reinforcing gender norms of bargaining behavior. Sex roles are 
stereotyped. Words typically used to describe women in 
negotiation include "childlike," "eager to soothe hurt feelings," and 
"gullible."58 For men, typical descriptors are "aggressive," 
"competitive," and "forceful."59 Not only are these traits 
descriptive, but they are also prescriptive, which is to say that 
society thinks that women are sensitive and also that a woman 
should be sensitive. 60 Laurie Rudman and Peter Glick have found 
that agentic women-meaning those displaying self-interested and 
autonomous traits-are rated as less socially skilled and likeable 
than identically presented men. 61 A subset of agentic traits 
related to social dominance elicit negative responses when a 
53. Brenda Major et al., Overworked and Underpaid: On the Nature of Gender 
Differences in Personal Entitlement, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1399, 
1405-10 (1984). 
54. Id. at 1409. 
55. ld. Interestingly, in both conditions, women worked longer than men. Id. 
56. See supra text accompanying notes 41--46. 
57. See Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women 
Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 416 (2004) 
(describing experiments where women were disliked after displaying aggressive 
behavior, which led to detrimental effects in work settings). 
58. Sandra Bern, The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny, 42 J. CLINICAL 
& CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 155, 156 tbl. 1 (1974). 
59. Id. 
60. Deborah Prentice & Erica Carranza, What Women and Men Should Be, 
Shouldn't Be, Are Allowed to Be, and Don't Have to Be: The Contents of Prescriptive 
Stereotypes, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 269 (2002); see also Bern, supra note 58, at 
156----61 (explaining an experiment in which stereotypical female traits were 
considered more socially desirable when associated with women). 
61. Laurie A Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and 
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 757 (2001). 
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woman expresses them, •2 but women can avoid being judged 
negatively by showing community-oriented behavior. 63 Other 
researchers have found that women who succeed in a male arena 
are penalized; they are rated as less likeable.•• For a man, 
likeability may not actually be important m terms of 
advancement, 65 but this is not true for women. Research has 
shown that when a woman is disliked, she elicits negative 
evaluations and lower reward allocations. 66 
Negotiation, as we have discussed, is a masculine-typed 
task. 67 Thus, female negotiators face a double-bind: aggressive 
negotiations may be punished with a lower reward allocation, but 
weak negotiation strategy is also likely to yield a low reward. 
C. Stereotype Threat 
There is also an important cognitive response to face-to-face 
bargaining in which gender is a salient dimension. A robust 
finding in social psychology termed "stereotype threat" documents 
that the salience of a negative stereotype about one's group 
hinders performance on tasks relevant to the stereotype. 68 As an 
illustration, one famous study showed that Asian girls performed 
better than baseline on a math test if ethnicity was salient (they 
answered questions about ethnicity right before the test) and 
worse than usual if gender was salient. 69 In other words, their 
performance conformed to the more salient stereotype: Asians are 
good at math, but girls are not. 70 
62. Id. at 758. 
63. ]d. 
64. Heilman et al., supra note 57, at 420 ("[W]hen success was made explicit, 
there was a differentiation between women and men ... with women deemed to be 
far less likable and more interpersonally hostile."). 
65. See Janet M. Stoppard & Rudolf Kalin, Gender Typing and Social 
Desirability of Personality in Person Evaluation, 7 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 209, 216 
(1983) (noting that even though women were judged to be more likable, men Were 
rated as doing better). But see Heilman et al., supra note 57, at 425 ("The fact that 
an unlikable individual is not viewed to be as worthy of salary increases or 
promotions ... ':;as found to be true regardless of whether the individual is a man 
or a woman .... ). 
66. Heilman et al., supra note 57, at 426. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 35--38. 
68. Nalini Ambody et al, Stereotype Susceptibility in Children: Effects of 
Identity Activation on Quantitative Performance, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 385, 388 (2001) 
("[B}oth positive and negative self-relevant stereotypes are insidious and can affect 
the performance of even very young children."). 
69. Id. at 387. 
70. Id. 
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Stereotype threat, also called stereotype confirmation, 71 is 
another mechanism by which gendered expectations and 
stereotypes affect women's bargaining behavior. 72 The stereotype 
about women and negotiation is that women are less comfortable 
and less effective than men in negotiation. 73 Laura Kray, Leigh 
Thompson, and Adam Galinsky asked fifty Master's in Business 
Administration (''MBA") students to write an essay about whether 
men or women have the advantage in negotiation.74 More 
participants said that men would have the advantage, invoking 
traditional gender stereotypes like men's assertiveness and 
strength. 75 Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky found that men were 
more successful than women when stereotypes were subtly or 
implicitly activated. 76 One method of implicit activation is simply 
the presence of a member of the opposite sex; 77 the authors found 
that in mixed-gender dyads, gender is more salient and stereotype 
threat is more likely to occur. 78 The authors argue that when 
stereotypes are implicitly activated, people are more likely to 
make judgments or otherwise act in ways consistent with the 
stereotype. 79 Divorce bargains, by definition, always involve 
mixed-gender dyads, so gender norm expectations are likely to be 
activated. 
D. Power 
Women typically hold 
relationships than men. so 
less power in society and in marital 
Power has shown to be a critical 
71. Kray et al., supra note 7, at 954-55. 
72. See id. at 946 (discussing an experiment in which the mere mention of 
negotiation skills as necessary in order for success and career advancement caused 
women to perform worse in negotiations). 
73. !d. at 943. 
74. ld. at 944. 
75. !d. 
76. !d. at 955. 
77. ld. at 946. 
78. !d. at 948 (finding that stereotype activation had a greater effect on 
performance in mixed-gender negotiating dyads). 
79. See id. at 955 (finding that activating implicit stereotypes positively 
impacted men's performance in negotiations, but had little effect on women). 
Interestingly, this effect does not hold true for explicit activations, which actually 
decrease the effects of negative stereotypes about women. !d.; see also infra Part 
N. 
80. See Nancy M. Henley & Marianne LaFrance, Gender as Culture: Difference 
and Dominance in Nonverbal Behavior, in NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR: PERSPECTIVES, 
APPLICATIONS, INTERCULTURAL INSIGHTS 351, 361-65 (Aaron Wolfgang ed., 1984) 
(discussing different nonverbal behaviors among men and women and arguing that 
the difference relates more to power than gender). 
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variable in negotiation. 81 First, power affects the use of language. 
In a seminal doctrine about social language, Penelope Brown and 
Steven Levinson argue that politeness was intricately linked with 
social power.B2 Low-power individuals are more inclined to use 
polite speech (such as carefully worded requests rather than direct 
demands) in order to avoid imposing on others, given their lack of 
status to do so. 83 They are less prone to criticize, disagree, or 
attempt to get something from another person. 84 Accordingly, 
women who lack power are intimidated by what is perceived as 
competitive or aggressive behavior in negotiations, 85 and they tend 
instead to use weaker, but more polite, strategies of 
communication. 86 
Second, power is associated with perceived freedom, control, 
and influence. 87 That association leads individuals to seek out 
resotrrces and to take action in competitive situations. 88 In 
experiments, individuals who are given power are more likely to 
negotiate. 89 Therefore, women's lack of power may inhibit them 
from taking any action at all. 
III. Divorce Law: Indeterminacy 
Another critical feature of the modern divorce law is 
indeterminacy, which exists on two levels. First, the law itself-
that which governs a judge's decision-making-permits enormous 
discretion on the part of the court.'o The section on Disposition of 
81. See Joe C. Magee et al., Power, Propensity to Negotiate, and Moving First in 
Competitive Interactions, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 200, 209 (2007) 
("[P]ower affects the initiation of negotiation and the making of first offers, as well 
as a positive effect of moving first on objective outcomes."). 
82. PENELOPE BROWN & STEVEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS: SOME UNIVERSALS 
IN LANGUAGE USAGE 59-60 (1987). 
83. David A. Morand, Language and Power: An Empirical Analysis of 
Linguistic Strategies Used in Superior-Subordinate Communication, 21 J. ORG. 
BEHAV. 235, 238 (2000). 
84. See id. ("Verbal hedges ... enable speakers to avoid committing themselves 
to the intent of their own speech act .... "). 
85. See BABCOCK & LA..'!CHEVER, supra note 12, at 113-14 (2003) (describing a 
web survey in which women expressed great anxiety about negotiating). 
86. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
87. See Dacher Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 265, 279 (2003); see also David Kipnis, Does Power Corrupt?, 24 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 33, 39 (1972) ("[P]ower increases the likelihood that 
the individual will attempt to influence and manipulate others."). 
88. Adam Galinsky et al., From Power to Action, 85 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 453, 462 (2003) ("[T]he possession and experience of power leads directly 
to the taking of action."). 
89. Magee et al., supra note 81, at 208. 
90. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCF. ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 288 (2007) 
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Property in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA'') asks 
the court to "equitably apportion" property between the spouses by 
taking into account several factors, many of which are broad and 
undefined. 91 These include the liabilities and needs of each of the 
parties, the contributions of each party to the joint assets, and the 
contribution of a spouse "as a homemaker or to the family unit."92 
Clearly, the law is intended to be a guide rather than a strict rule. 
In fact, courts often consider a case in its entirety rather than 
factor by factor. 93 At least one legal commentator has noted that 
outcomes in court have varied more and more under the new law; 
they have been both less predictable and more difficult to 
achieve. 94 
The second layer of indeterminacy is caused by the common 
practice of determining divorce outcomes through private 
negotiation between the parties. 95 As such, the distribution that 
would result from a judge-made agreement is useful as a point of 
comparison, or as the threat-point. 96 In other words, the more 
that parties know about how a judge would allocate their property, 
the more clearly the bounds of the negotiation are set. 97 Rational 
parties would not agree to a distribution in which they receive less 
than they would get from a judge (minus the cost of litigation)-"8 
"[B]argaining in the shadow of the law"'' presents various 
problems from a decision-making perspective. Parties need to 
predict not only how the other will respond to each proposal, but 
also how a judge would decide the case. Even when the law is 
clear, there is evidence to suggest that biased decision-making 
(discussing the ways in which courts may apportion property). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. See, e.g., Lightburn v. Lightburn, No. 2445-97-2, 1998 WL 169499, at *1 
(Va. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1998); Thomas v. Thomas, No. 1619-95-4, 1996 WL 679985, 
at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1996); Masri v. Masri, 48 Va. Cir. 5 (Cir. Ct. 1999). 
94. Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's 
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 739 
(1991). For example, the proceedings require longer durations before decisions are 
made. ld. at 651 (stating that the average case duration in New York has 
increased from 1.3 years to 1.5 years). 
95. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 951 ("[TJhe overwhelming 
majority of divorcing couples resolve distributional questions ... without bringing 
any contested issue to court for adjudication."). 
96. See id. at 968 (discussing the role of background legal rules as a baseline for 
private divorce negotiations). 
97. Id. at 968. 
98. Id. at 968--69. 
99. Id. at 969, 997. 
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hinders the efficiency of bargaining with the law as a backdropJOO 
In this Section, we review four relevant phenomena-situational 
ambiguity, risk aversion, personal entitlement, and anchoring-for 
evidence of that bias. 
A. Situational Ambiguity 
The first issue-ambiguity-is indeterminacy itself. In 
empirical studies, ambiguous negotiating terms have resulted in 
better outcomes for men than women.1o1 Certain situations are 
highly structured with clear demands, limitations, and 
expectations about appropriate behavior; others are more 
ambiguous, with the appropriate response unclear.wz 
Psychologists refer to these two general categories of situations as 
strong versus weak situations. 103 A number of studies indicate 
that gender differences and other individual differences decrease 
in stronger situations, assuming the appropriate response is not 
gendered_l04 In one study, John Dovidio and colleagues videotaped 
men and women in mixed-sex pairs discussing a gender-neutral 
topic and found that men were more verbally dominant than 
women were. 105 However, when the experimenters manipulated 
social expectations, thereby strengthening the situations, 
participants of both sexes behaved in conformity to the salient 
expectation. lOB Other researchers have found that the gender gap 
in pay expectations decreases with explicit performance 
feedback. 107 
100. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effects of Marital 
Misconduct on No-Fault Divorce Bargaining, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming Jan. 
2008) (finding that subjects tend to disfavor marital wrong-doers in divorce 
negotiations, even under clear instructions about the no-fault law); see also Linda 
Babcock & Geoge Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-
Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 114-15 (1997) (finding that people 
analyzing legal materials find arguments supporting their own preferred outcome 
to be more important and convincing). 
101. See, e.g., Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Constraints and Triggers: Situational 
Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 951", 957 
(2005) ("Under high ambiguity, ... male buyers walked out of the negotiation 
paying 27% less than did female buyers."). 
102. I d. at 952. 
103. Id. 
104. See, e.g., id. at 962 ("[G)ender effects on negotiation performance were 
significantly greater under conditions of high [weak situations) as compared with 
low structural ambiguity [strong situations)."). 
105. John Dovidio et al., Power Displays Between Men and Women in 
Discussions of Gender.Linked Tasks: A Multichannel Study, 55 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 580, 583 (1988). 
106. Id. 
107. See, e.g., Wayne H. Bylsma & Brenda Major, Two Routes to Eliminating 
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Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock, and Katherine 
McGinn have recently demonstrated that gender differences 
emerge when ambiguity is present in negotiations.1os In one 
empirical demonstration, the researchers surveyed graduating 
MBA students, asking for information about each student's 
starting salary and industry.l09 The team compared gender 
differences in starting salaries in industries for which MBA 
students had vague salary expectations (i.e., telecommunications 
and health care/human services), as compared to industries for 
which most students had clear information and expectations (i.e., 
investment banking and consulting).11o They found that the 
gender wage gap was more than twice as high for the high-
ambiguity industries.' 11 Although this study cannot alone prove 
that gender differences in negotiation in the "ambiguous" salary 
industries cause the gender wage gap, it is certainly consistent 
with the hypothesis. 
Experimental results have also demonstrated a causal effect 
between ambiguity and gender differences in negotiation. In one 
experiment, participants were given a negotiating scenario and 
asked to play the roles of the negotiators, with a monetary reward 
as a function of the outcome of the negotiation.' 12 In the low-
ambiguity condition, participants had a limit as well as a target 
price, whereas in the high-ambiguity condition, participants had 
only a limit, but no target price.' 13 Thus, the experiment explicitly 
manipulated the situational ambiguity through the parties' target 
and reserve prices. 114 In the high-ambiguity condition, male 
buyers came out of the negotiation paying 27% less than female 
buyers; however, in the low-ambiguity condition, there were no 
significant sex differences. 115 The implications of this research for 
divorce bargaining and divorce policy are clear: the indeterminacy 
of the current law may put women at a disadvantage by making it 
unclear exactly what they should be trying to achieve in the 
divorce negotiations. As long as women fulfill the gender 
Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement: Social Comparisons and Performance 
Evaluations, 16 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193, 193 (1992) (finding that absent feedback 
or wage comparison information, women felt they deserved less pay than men, but 
with feedback, women felt they deserved as much pay as the men). 
108. Bowles et al., supra note 101, at 951. 
109. ld. at 954. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 955--56. 
112. Id. at 956. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 957. 
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expectation by asking for and receiving less than men, ambiguous 
cues are likely to elicit behaviors in congruence with those norms. 
The result of the modern, multi-factor law is thus in stark contrast 
with its purpose, which was to make the notions of ownership and 
contribution more flexible in order to move away from a regime in 
which the male breadwinner was entitled to all of the property in 
his name or purchased with his income.116 
B. Risk Aversion 
Indeterminacy may also interact with different preferences 
for risk. Bargaining aggressively under a vague standard is a 
riskier tactic: it is not clear what distribution will result if the 
other party decides to take the case to the judge, and the litigation 
costs alone are often quite high. 117 As such, it may be possible for 
the more risk-averse party to be pressured into a lower settlement, 
as long as litigation does not necessarily guarantee a better 
outcome. Indeed, evidence suggests that women tend to perceive 
greater risk for most negative outcomes, have higher levels of fear 
and worry, and behave more cautiously.ns 
C. Judgment Calls: Personal Entitlement 
The very nature of indeterminacy requires the divorce parties 
to make judgment calls about how much they are entitled to in the 
settlement and how much they need to Jive on. There are two 
reasons why we might expect women to make lower estimates of 
both of these: differential entitlement and differential anchoring. 
Women and men differ on measures of personal entitlement, 
especially when information is limited 119-as it is in divorce. 
Because the law includes so many factors and because the 
standard appears so subjective, it may be quite difficult for either 
party to determine how much of the marital estate he or she 
deserves. Brenda Major and colleagues asked male and female 
l 16. See Mary A Throne, Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 194, 195--97 (noting that one of the most important drivers of 
modern divorce reform, including the trend toward equitable distribution, is to 
ratify the partnership view of marriage, a view not supported by the common-law 
title regime of marital property). 
117. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 29, at 971-72. 
118. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 12, at 135, 138 (noting that "women 
... see the world as more dangerous" than men and that "women's fear of taking 
social risks prompts them to behave more cautiously than men"). 
119. See Major et al., supra note 53, at 1410 ("[S]ex differences in self-pay do not 
occur when information about the pay of other men and women is readily 
available."). 
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college students to pay themselves (out of the view of other 
experimenters) after performing a task, and they also asked 
another group to do as much work as they thought fair for a fixed 
amount of money.'20 Women paid themselves less and worked 
longer than men, although their work was more efficient and more 
accurate than that of the male participants. 121 In one variant on 
this experiment, Major and her colleagues left participants a list of 
the amounts that (bogus} previous participants paid themselves.'22 
In this trial, when participants had pay information, men and 
women did not differ on self·pay123 
Lisa Barron has identified two methods by which people 
might determine how much they should be paid. 124 In her study, 
most men said that their salary should be determined by their 
worth, i.e., skills, capacities, and experiences. 125 Women, on the 
other hand, were more likely to indicate that their worth as 
employees was determined by how much the organization was 
willing to pay.'26 
The aforementioned research on gender and entitlement has 
primarily been discussed in reference to the gender wage gap. It 
need not be so limited; this could be an important difference in the 
divorce context when parties are determining entitlements in the 
settlement. Barron's research suggests that men would be likely 
to ask the questions: "What did I contribute? What do I 
deserve?" 127 For women, the questions-impossible to answer 
with specificity-are: "What do the rules say that I should get? 
What does the legal system establish as my entitlement?" 128 As 
Barron notes in her study of pay entitlement, self·determined 
worth is almost always higher than externally·derived worth.129 
As a result, we would expect that men would generally feel 
entitled to more of the resource pool than would women. 130 
120. See id. at 1401, 1405-06. 
121. Id. at 1409. 
122. Id. at 1402. 
123. !d. at 1404. 
124. Lisa Barron, Ask and You Shall Receive?: Gender Differences in Negotiators' 
Beliefs About Requests for a Higher Salary, 56 HUM. REL. 635 (2003). 
125. I d. at 647, 654. 
126. Id. at 646 ("[T]hese negotiators regard the organization as the final arbiter 
of their value."). 
127. See id. at 647, 654. 
128. See id. at 646, 654. 
129. Id. at 651 (noting that those who know their worth request higher salaries 
than those who are unsure of their worth and thus use external factors to 
determine their worth). 
130. To be sure, men make more financial contributions to most marriages, 
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D. Judgment Calls: Anchoring 
A related problem in negotiating in an indeterminate setting 
is the problem of "anchoring," a robust source of judgment bias 
discussed in psychology literature. 131 The idea of the anchoring 
effect is that when people make a judgment-say, estimate the 
value of something-they look for other relevant judgments to aid 
in their decision-making. 132 So, if you are trying to judge how 
much a used car is worth, one number you might take into account 
is the asking price. Knowing that the asking price will probably be 
inflated, you adjust your own estimate downward to come up with 
a number as a counteroffer. This seems fairly reasonable, but 
anchoring studies show that people rarely adjust adequately from 
the anchor. 133 Even irrelevant anchors (demonstrated through 
random number generators in experiments) have an impact on 
negotiation outcomes. 134 Thus, counteroffers and final outcomes of 
negotiations are highly affected by starting offers which act as 
anchors for the opposing party,l35 
In the divorce context, this raises the concern that women 
who need to evaluate both their contributions to the marital assets 
and their needs post-divorce will anchor to lower figures than will 
men. Tn fact, research has .shown that women's wage satisfaction 
is determined by their relative success compared to other women 
rather than to men, even if they have information about the wages 
of both sexes, since the female wage anchor is more salient and 
relevant to them. 136 Another possibility is that women will focus 
on their own earning power, either on their wages from a time 
whereas women tend to be responsible for non-market labor, which is more difficult 
to cast in monetary terms. See generally id. at 652 ("[R]esearchers have speculated 
that men and women traditionally have achieved their worth from different sources 
with men deriving worth from the market and women from the home."). 
131. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, 
185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974) (describing anchoring as "mak[ing] estimates by starting 
from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer"). 
132. Id. 
133. !d. (noting that anchoring "adjustments are typically insufficient"). 
134. Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of 
Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decision-Making, 32 PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 198 (finding that judges' sentencing decisions "were 
influenced by random numbers even if [the judges] determined these numbers 
themselves by throwing dice"). 
135. Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role 
of Perspective-Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
657, 657 (2001) ("[W]hichever party made the 1st offer obtained a better 
outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices."). 
136. Wayne H. Bylsma & Brenda Major, Social Comparisons and Contentment: 
Exploring the Psyclwlogical Costs of the Gender Wage Gap, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 
241, 247 (1994). 
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when they worked at full earning capacity or on their current 
salary. Married women earn much less than married men. In 
2004, the average income for married males was almost $58,000; 
for married women, it was less than $30,000,137 Other research 
indicates that when these factors are salient, women take them 
into account when determining appropriate pay for a new job or 
task.138 Note that it is likely that these factors are important for 
men as well. As a descriptive matter, however, anchors to current 
salary or even to friends' salaries will be more informative for men 
because married men and their friends are more likely to be 
working full-time at full earning capacity already.'" Women, on 
the other hand, must make a bigger adjustment insofar as they 
more likely need to shift attention from in-home labor to market 
labor.140 It is thus likely that men's anchors for all of these 
relevant figures are higher than women's given their salary 
advantage, their greater sense of entitlement, and the information 
they have about others like them. These differential anchors 
should benefit men in the divorce negotiation. 
IV. Divorce Law: No More Alimony 
Historically, marriage entitled a wife to lifetime support by 
her husband, even if the couple divorced. 141 Given that a woman 
was expected to eschew market labor in favor of home-making, 
this arrangement made contractarian sense-if the woman was to 
dedicate herself to her family, at the expense of investing in her 
own earning capacity via education or work experience, she would 
want to be assured of financial support even if her husband left 
137. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANNUAL 
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY (2004), available at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032005/ 
perinc/new02_050.htm. 
138. Serge Desmarais & James Curtis, Gender and Perceived Pay Entitlement: 
Testing for Effects of Experience with Income, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
141, 147 (1994). 
139. Id. at 141 ("Men are more likely to draw comparisons with other men who 
they understand to receive better pay."). 
140. See Phillip Cohen & Suzanne Bianchi, Marriage, Children, and Women's 
Employment: What Do We Know?, 122 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 1999, at 22, 27-30 
(citing 1998 statistics that 46.1% of married women and 34.7% of married mothers 
with young children worked full time, and arguing that "women have reached the 
point where marriage in itself has relatively little effect on their labor supply, 
although access to other income, which, for married women, is primarily earnings 
from their spouse, continues to exert a downward pressure on women's allocation of 
time to paid work"). 
141. Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 
41 (2006) ("[S]tates' laws have historically treated marital obligations of support 
(usually a husband's duty to support his wife) as enduring."). 
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her.142 More recently, as we have discussed to some extent, the 
law has shifted its focus from family values to individual 
autonomy.143 Under the UMDA, spousal support is granted only 
as a result of financial hardship, and the more common remedy is 
rehabilitative alimony144 Rehabilitative alimony is a short-term 
obligation intended to help the wife get on her feet, through job 
training or education, so that she can support herself.145 The goal 
of the current law is to separate the spouses financially, 
terminating their financial relationship at the same time they are 
terminating their emotional and legal relationship.146 
The movement away from long-term spousal support has 
enormous financial implications for women, which we will only 
briefly review here. Because most married women do not work at 
full earning capacity, 1" usually due to household and family care 
responsibilities, 148 at divorce they are at a significant 
disadvantage in the labor market.149 Furthermore, as long as 
women are more likely than men to have custody of children 150 
(and, even with joint custody arrangements, more likely to be 
providing for the day-to-day care of the children 1' 1 ), they are at a 
further disadvantage in the labor market because their work 
schedules are constrained by their child care obligations.152 
142. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family 
Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 721-23 (1993) (noting that previous rules protected 
spouses who committed themselves to family care rather than to employment). 
143. See id. at 723. 
144. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT§ 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 446 (1998). 
145. See 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce § 853 (1998) ("The concept of rehabilitative 
alimony is based on the premise that the divorced spouse has a potential for self-
support that needs development."). 
146. See id. ("An award of rehabilitative alimony is also designed to permit 
former spouses to develop their own lives free from obligations to each other."). 
This is not, of course, possible in the case of child support. 
147. See Cohen & Bianchi, supra note 140, at 30. 
148. See Glenna Spitze & Karen Loscocco, Women's Position in the Household, 39 
Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 647, 648 (1999) (arguing that women's market labor supgly is 
constrained by their disproportionate share of household labor). 
149. Matthew McKeever & Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Reexamining the Costs of 
Marital Disruption for Women, 82 Soc. SCI. Q. 202, 215 (2001) (finding that, 
although the costs of divorce have lessened as a result of married women's 
increased participation in the labor market, women still fare worse than men after 
divorce because their work is not as lucrative). 
150. See Judith Seltzer, Consequences of Marital Disruption for Children, 20 
ANN. REV. Soc. 235, 240--41 (1994) (noting that mothers often have primary 
responsibility for children after divorce). 
151. See generally id. at 242 (citing the most common form of joint custody to be 
when children spend the majority of their time with their mother). 
152. Many commentators question the adequacy of the child support awards 
assisting women with these obligations. See, e.g., Mark Lino, Do Child Support 
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A. Initiation of Negotiation 
There are also reasons to believe that the new arrangement 
is disadvantageous for women at the bargaining table. Linda 
Babcock's book, Women Don't Ask, reveals the tendency for women 
to eschew negotiating for things for themselves. 153 A series of 
studies by Deborah Small, Michele Gelfand, Linda Babcock, and 
Hilary Gettman showed that women were much less likely than 
men to negotiate for themselves, even when they were cued that 
negotiating was acceptable.154 In one task, participants were told 
that they would be paid between three and ten dollars for playing 
a 'word game as part of a study. 155 At the end of the session, 
experimenters offered the participants three dollars and asked: 
"Is that OK?" Few participants requested more money, but all but 
one of those who did were men. 156 Typical negotiation tasks 
explicitly inform participants they are in a negotiation and 
examine the targets, tactics, and outcomes of the negotiation; in 
contrast, this task was unique in that it examined if and when 
people negotiate when the negotiation is not prescribed. 157 
In another condition, participants were offered three dollars 
and explicitly informed that they could negotiate for more 
money. 158 Here, many men asked for (and all who asked, received) 
the full ten dollars. Still, very few women opted to negotiate.'" 
Finally, in the third condition, participants were offered three 
dollars and told that they could ask for a higher payment. 160 At 
last, gender differences disappeared; as many women as men 
asked for, and received, the higher payment.'61 
Why did women respond to the cue to ask, but not the cue to 
Awards Cover the Cost of Raising Children?, 11 FAM:. ECON. & NUTRITION REV. 29 
(1998) (arguing that child support levels are inadequate due to both underpayment 
by non-custodial spouses and insufficient awards from courts). 
153. BABCOCK & LAsCHEVER, supra note 12, at 2-4 (citing studies "which 
suggest that men are asking for things they want and initiating negotiations much 
more often than women"). 
154. Deborah Small et al., VVho Goes to the Bargaining Table: Understanding 
Gender Variation in the Initiation of Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 600, 600-13 (2007). 
155. Id. at 603-04. 
156. ld. (reporting that 23% of the men studied asked for more money without 
receiving a cue). 
157. Id. at 604. 
158. Id. at 604-05. 
159. Id. at 605 (finding that 17% of women and 59% of men negotiated for a 
higher payment). In the control portion of this condition, where no cue to negotiate 
was given, no women asked for more money. Id. 
160. I d. at 607. 
161. ld. (finding that 73% of women and 69% of men asked for more money). 
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negotiate? The authors argued-and found evidence-that the 
prospect of "negotiating'' evokes negative thoughts and feelings in 
women more so than men, but asking does not.I62 They further 
suggested (and offered empirical evidence in support of their 
contention) that the crucial difference between asking and 
negotiating has to do with power.163 Asking is something people in 
low-status positions do: children ask for an allowance, for 
example. Asking is polite. Negotiations, on the other hand, tend 
to be the province of the powerful: political figures, lawyers, and 
business leaders negotiate with one another. Survey studies have 
shown that women rate negotiating as being as enjoyable as trips 
to the dentist, whereas men actually find negotiating to be kind of 
fun.I64 
B. Judgment Calls: Alimony us. Property Division 
The alimony laws may have also helped to reduce the 
indeterminacy in divorce negotiations simply by providing a metric 
of negotiating success that is easy to understand. Most people can 
figure out how much money they need to make in a month or even 
in a year in order to get by or live normally. Thus, a wife who 
needs a total of $3,000 per month in order to maintain a modest 
lifestyle, and who makes $2,000 per month at her job, knows she 
needs an additional $1,000 in alimony. In essence, because the 
monthly requirement is concrete and may be obvious, it may 
provide a more useful anchor than the anchors available in 
property division negotiations. Her calculations help her to set a 
reserve and target price. In property-division negotiations, it is 
more difficult to define a successful negotiation. 
Implications and Conclusions 
It is beyond the scope of this essay-and beyond the reach of 
the evidence we have cited-to draw bold policy conclusions based 
on gender differences in negotiating style and tactics. There are 
good normative arguments against alimony or judicial scrutiny of 
separation agreements, whatever we may report on the empirical 
data regarding women in bargaining situations. Nonetheless, this 
is important research for legal scholars and policymakers alike. 
Empirical research can help us evaluate the extent to which the 
current system is justified given its goals, and, where it is not, 
162. ld. at 610. 
163. ld. at 608-10. 
164. See, e.g., BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 12, at 114. 
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behavioral research like this may suggest why the system is not 
meeting its goals. We might assume, for example, that 
indeterminate rules leave the parties less constrained in their 
private negotiations and thus better able to maximize their joint 
welfare. But if the empirical data suggests that the parties are not 
maximizing joint welfare or that there is a systematic imbalance 
between them (and it does), we might question the value of 
indeterminate rules and their utility for the normative model. 
We are not the first legal scholars to focus on the importance 
of the default rule. Divorce laws are essentially default rules that 
couples are permitted to contract around, with special latitude for 
contracts made before the marriage (as opposed to contracts 
negotiated at the time of divorce). The reason Donald Trump 
obtains prenuptial agreements is so that he need not comply with 
the rules of equal or equitable distribution in his state. The 
default is psychologically important, and today, the no-spousal-
support default rule is increasingly difficult to contract around. 
Oren Bar Gill and Chaim Fershtman have suggested that contract 
law in particular instantiates a kind of learning process by which 
people internalize the rules by interacting with them.'65 When, 
for example, the law shifts its focus away from alimony and 
toward individual autonomy, people are more likely to think that 
this is not simply true in a positivist sense but also right in a 
moral or political sense. Thus, the default rule has importance for 
its expressive content and for its effects on people's learning about 
the legal system. 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein have suggested that 
behavioral research can have normative implications without 
being paternalistic in the traditional sense of the concept. 166 Their 
"libertarian paternalism" is essentially the idea that we can use 
behavioral research to inform our formulation of the default rule, 
leaving parties free to make their own choices but, should they opt 
to simply follow the norm, subject to a kind of wealth-maximizing 
default rule. In the realm of divorce laws, it would be a useful 
exercise to evaluate the effects of the current default rules, and to 
question how they distribute goods between the parties and, more 
broadly, among different groups in American society. 
165. Oren Bar Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, 20 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 331 (2004). 
166. Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 175, 177 (2003) (arguing that an employer who runs an "opt out" 401K plan is 
acting paternalistically but is not interfering with employee preferences). 
